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FROM THE PROXY TO THE PRINCIPAL:
DISAPPOINTMENTS IN CALIFORNIA'S
EDUCATION FINANCE POLICY AND THE
BENEFITS OF A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH
Elizabeth Cairns*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1971, the California Supreme Court declared in
Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I) that wealth is a suspect class,

that education is a fundamental interest, and that a school
financing scheme producing vast inequalities in per pupil
spending was unconstitutional.' In holding that the financing
scheme was a violation of equal protection, the court asserted
that it furthered the "cherished idea of American education"
that "public schools shall make available to all children
equally the abundant gifts of learning."2 The court concluded
its opinion by drawing on the human rights notions of
education asserted by Horace Mann, a prominent education
reformist in the 1800s: 3
* Comments Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Vol. 48; J.D. Candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A., International Development
Studies, University of California, Los Angeles. The author is grateful to her
God and family for their continued support and also would like to thank
Assistant Professor Lia Epperson for providing valuable guidance in the
development of this comment.
1. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano1), 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
2. Id. at 1266. In a later decision, Butt v. California, the California
Supreme Court affirmed that the ultimate responsibility rests with the State to
provide "basic equality of educational opportunity." Butt v. California, 842 P.2d
1240, 1251 (Cal. 1992); see also William S. Koski, Ensuring an "Adequate"
Education for Our Nation's Youth: How Can We Overcome the Barriers?,27
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 13, 37 (2007); Lisa Lopez Trifiletti, Note, The Role of
Litigation in Education Reform: Holding California Responsible, While
PreservingLocal Control, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 967, 972-73 (2004).
3. See,
e.g.,
Encyclopedia
Britannica
Online,
Horace
Mann,
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9050568/Horace-Mann (last visited Feb.
25, 2008).
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in the existence of a great, immortal
I believe ...
immutable principle of natural law, or natural ethics,-a
principle antecedent to all human institutions, and
incapable of being abrogated by any ordinance of man...
which proves the [a]bsolute right to an education of every
human being that comes into the world, and which, of
course, proves the correlative duty of every government to
see that the means of that education are provided for all..
4

However, almost thirty years later, the limited reach of
the equal protection victory proved to be immensely
unsatisfactory. In 2000, Williams v. California,5 a classaction suit involving mainly minority and low-income
students, revealed the dire state of California's public
schools. 6 The plaintiffs in Williams depicted the miserable
conditions of facilities and the utter lack of learning
instruments available at schools throughout the Golden
State.7 Although education advocates won a battle against
unequal funding in 1971,1 they were losing the war in
providing to all children a meaningful education aimed at the
full development of each child's abilities.
In 2004, the Williams case settled. 9 Pursuant to the
settlement, the Governor of California executed five new laws
that set forth standards and accountability, required the
gradual abandonment of year-round, multi-track school
schedules, 10 and provided funds for instructional materials
4. Serrano 1, 487 P.2d at 1266 (quoting HORACE MANN, THE GROUND OF
THE FREE SCHOOL SYSTEM (1846), reprinted in V OLD S. LEAFLETS 177, 177-80

(Dirs. of the Old South Work 1902) (printing a passage from Mann's Tenth
Annual Report as Secretary of the Massachusetts State Board of Education)).
5. Williams v. California, No. 31-2236 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 17, 2000).
6. See generally First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory
Relief, Williams v. California, No. 31-2236 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2000)
[hereinafter FAC], availableat http://www.decentschools.org/courtpapers.php.
7. Id.
8. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 1, The
Aims of Education, art. 29 (1), U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2001/1 (Apr. 17, 2001)
[hereinafter The Aims of Education].
9. Decentschools.org, Williams Settlement Highlights - April 2005,
http://decentschools.org/settlementWilliams-Highlights-April-

2005.pdf.
10. A multi-track, year-round education scheme is generally utilized when

there is extreme crowding. See JEANNIE OAKES, PLAINTIFFS' EXPERT REPORT
MULTI-TRACK, YEAR-ROUND CALENDAR (CONCEPT 6) AND BUSING TO ADDRESS
2,
OVERCROWDING

http'J/www.decentschools.orgexpert-reports/oakes_report-3.pdf

[hereinafter
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and facilities assessment. 1 Thus, the Williams settlement
resulted in many tangible benefits. 2 Notwithstanding such
benefits,
the
resource-focused
settlement
legislation
insufficiently addressed important issues, such as severe
overcrowding, and failed to adequately focus on providing a
meaningful education to all children. 1 3 Although financial
backing and minimum standards are necessary, they are
insufficient to relieve the government of its "duty," as Horace
Mann asserted, to ensure as a matter of human right that
"the means of []education are provided for all."1 4
This comment will argue that international human rights
concepts can help California develop a more holistic, goaloriented education finance policy that is consequently more
likely than the current policy to achieve long-lasting equal
education opportunities. In contrast to equal resource inputs,
a human rights approach to evaluating public education
examines directly and multi-dimensionally whether or not
children are really being educated. Part II of this paper
introduces two international instruments that define
education based on a human rights perspective.15 This part
also chronicles education finance policy throughout America
and California, and, in particular, the change in America
from an equal funding focus to an educational adequacy
approach in education finance litigation. 16
The section
concludes by examining the unsatisfactory reach of the
current education policy in California as manifest in the
Williams v. CaliforniaComplaint and its limited settlement. 7
Part III introduces the shortcomings of the settlement in
Williams v. California to effectively address ongoing
limitations to quality education in California's schools.' 8 Part
EXPERT REPORT].

11. BROOKS M. ALLEN, THE WILLIAMS V. CALIFORNIA SETTLEMENT: THE
FIRST
YEAR
OF
IMPLEMENTATION
10
(2005),

http://decentschools.org/settlement/WilliamsReportWeb2005.pdf.
12. See Christopher R. Lockard, In the Wake of Williams v. State: The Past,
Present, and Futureof Education FinanceLitigation in California,57 HASTINGS
L.J. 385,412 (2005).
13. See infra Part IV.B.1-2.
14. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano 1), 487 P.2d 1241, 1266 (Cal. 1971) (quoting
MANN, supra note 4, at 177-80).
15. See infra Part II.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See infra Part III.
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IV of this comment examines the shortcomings of the
Williams settlement and how concepts from human rights
instruments, particularly the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, can provide a more holistic, solutionfocused educational opportunity policy in California. 19 This
analysis focuses on the areas of resource allocation,
overcrowding, and, in general, the potential benefits born
from the broad scope of human rights norms. Part V, then,
proposes various ways how, and reasons why, to adopt
international human rights norms as part of California's
education policy.2 ° Finally, this comment concludes in Part
VI by arguing that the approach to education policy in
California should be grounded in viewing available,
accessible, acceptable, and adaptable education 2 as a human
right, rather than a financial woe solved by writing a check.2 2

II. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND DOMESTIC
EDUCATION FINANCE POLICY

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child are international treaties that recognize education as a
human right.2 3 Under both international instruments, when
a country ratifies the treaty, that country agrees to
acknowledge the rights asserted in the instrument.2 4 The
general policy in these instruments requires more than the
allotment of a minimum or equal amount of funds for
education and inclusively addresses potential peripheral
barriers to the realization of the asserted right to education.2 5
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part V.
21. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. and
Cultural Rights, Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13, The Right to Education
(art.13 of the Covenant), U.N. Doc. E/C 12/1999/10 (Dec. 8, 1999), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/E.C. 12.1999.10.En?OpenDocument
[hereinafter The Right to Education].
22. See infra Part VI.
23. See infra Part II.A-B.
24. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Bodies,
Rights
Treaty
Human
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/treaty/index.htm (last visited Feb. 13,
2008).
25. See infra Part II.A-B.
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In juxtaposition, the various state policies regarding public
education in America have focused predominately on the
funding of education. 26 This part will first look at how the
international human rights treaties generally frame the
human right to education,27 then it will briefly examine
educational policy across America,28 and finally conclude by
discussing education finance in the context of California's
public schools.29
A. The Right to Education and the InternationalCovenant
on Economic, Social and CulturalRights
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) is the human rights treaty that
primarily recognizes economic, social, and cultural rights,
including the right to self-determination, the right to work,
and the right to education." The United States is one among
a small number of nations that has not ratified the ICESCR,
which was adopted in 1966.31
Specifically, the ICESCR
recognizes the "right of everyone to education" and that
education should be aimed at the "full development of the
human personality and the sense of its dignity."3 2 Further, it
sets forth that education should facilitate "tolerance and
friendship among ... all racial, ethnic or religious groups."33
Implementation of the rights under the ICESCR is monitored
by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.3 4
Article 13 of the ICESCR defines the right to education
by four essential features: availability, accessibility,
26. See infra Part II.C-D.
27. See infra Part II.A-B.
28. See infra Part II.C.
29. See infra Part II.D.
30. Association for Women's Rights in Development, Facts and Issues,
http://www.awid.org/publications/primers/factsissues3.pdf (last visited Feb. 13,
2008).
31. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
and
Reservations,
Declarations
(last
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/3.htm#reservations
visited Feb. 13, 2008).
32. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 13,
Dec. 16, 1966, 1966 WL 11590, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCRI.
33. Id.
34. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Human
Rights
Treaty
Bodies,
httpJ/www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/treaty/index.htm (last visited Feb. 13,
2008).
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The availability component
acceptability, and adaptability.
requires a sufficient quantity of functioning educational
institutions within any given jurisdiction. 6 The accessibility
component requires that education be accessible to everyone
Under this requirement, education
without discrimination.
should be especially accessible to "the most vulnerable
Third, the form and substance
groups, in law and fact..... ,,3"
3
The instrument
of the education must be acceptable9.
indicates that "acceptable" includes relevant education,
culturally appropriate education, and education of good
quality.4" Finally, education must be adaptable to the needs
of students in diverse social and cultural settings.4 ' Thus, the
right to education under the ICESCR is multidimensional
and reflects a focus on education itself.42 The Convention on
the Rights of the Child further expands on the right to
education embodied in the ICESCR in the context of a child's
education.4 3
B. The Right to Education and the Convention on the Rights
of the Child
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 44
addresses a more nuanced right of education for children.
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the CRC in
1989. 41 The United States is the only industrialized country
in the United Nations that has not ratified the CRC. 46 Like
35. See The Right to Education,supra note 21, 6.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See The Right to Education, supra note 21, 6.
42. See id.
43. See infra Part II.B.
44. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 43
[hereinafter CRCI.
45. Id.; Cynthia Price Cohen, Introductory Note to the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1448 (1989); see also
Trisha Loscalzo Yates, Lead Article, A Criticism of the No Child Left Behind
Act: How the Convention on the Rights of the Child Can Offer PromisingReform
of Education Legislation in America, 5 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 399,
422 (2006).
46. See Yates, supra note 45 (noting that the United States is the only
nation in the United Nations community, except Somalia, that has not ratified
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the ICESCR, the implementation mechanism of the CRC is
comprised of submitting regular reports to an international
committee.17 Rather than penalizing non-compliance under
the CRC,48 the reporting requirement aims to achieve
compliance with treaty obligations by allowing states to
request "technical assistance" from other specialized agencies
if the aims embodied in the treaty are not met.4 9
Articles 28 and 29 of the CRC pertain specifically to a
child's education. ° Foundationally, Article 28 recognizes the
right to education on the basis of equal opportunity. 5 1 Then
Article 29 states that the goal of education is to develop "the
child's personality, talents and mental and physical abilities
to their fullest potential." 2 The CRC further expounds on the
right of education recognized in Article 28 by insisting that
5 3
education be child-centered, child-friendly, and empowering.
Thus, the CRC, in conjunction with the ICESCR, enumerates
complementary norms that help ensure that the individual
can realize his or her right to education. This broad, rightsbased approach differs starkly from many domestic education
policies that primarily view education in terms of minimal
54
standards and/or obliquely through equal protection.
C. School Finance Litigation in America
1.

Focus on Funding

Various scholarly works by Paul Minorini and Stephen
Sugarman trace school finance approaches in America from
equality to adequacy. 5 Beginning in the second half of the
the CRC).
47. See Cohen, supra note 45, at 1451-52.
48. Id. at 1452 n.26.
49. Id.
50. CRC, supra note 44, at 53-54. Article 2 of the CRC, furthermore, sets
forth an umbrella clause to ensure that all rights under the CRC are respected
and ensured without discrimination. Id. at 46.
51. Id. at 53.
52. Id. at 54.
53. See The Aims of Education,supra note 8.
54. See infra Part II.C-D.
55. See Paul A. Minorini & Stephen D. Sugarman, Educational Adequacy
and the Courts: The Promise and Problems of Moving to a New Paradigm, in
EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE 175 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds.,
1999) [hereinafter Minorini & Sugarman, EducationalAdequacy]; see also Paul
A. Minorini & Stephen D. Sugarman, School Finance Litigation in the Name of
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twentieth century, many scholars posited theories that
addressed educational inequalities by focusing their attention
on unequal school funding. 6 In many states, funding for
public schools comes primarily from state and local funds
with only about seven percent from federal support.
For
example, in 1971, California state funding was comprised of a
flat grant, "equalization aid" granted in inverse proportion to
a district's wealth, and "supplemental aid" granted to some
impoverished school districts.5 "
Local funding, drawn
primarily from local property taxes, 59 however, was the
predominant funding mechanism for school districts.60 Given
that the primary resource for school funding came from
property taxes, many schools located in poorer districts that
did not generate high property tax revenue had significantly
less funding.6 1 In the words of the California Supreme Court,
the financing scheme made the "quality of the child's
education a function of the wealth of his parents and
neighbors."6 2 Early advocates then attacked this problem
using various theories,63 one of which was "wealth

Educational Equity: Its Evolution, Impact, and Future, in EQUITY AND
ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE 34 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999)
[hereinafter Minorini & Sugarman, School Finance].
56. See Minorini & Sugarman, Educational Adequacy, supra note 55; see
also Minorini & Sugarman, School Finance,supra note 55.
57. Robert Berne & Leanna Stiefel, Concepts of School FinanceEquity: 1970
to the Present, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE 7, 9 (Helen F.
Ladd et al. eds., 1999).
58. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano1), 487 P.2d 1241, 1247 (Cal. 1971).
59. See Berne & Stiefel, supra note 57, at 9.
60. Id.
61. See generally Serrano v. Priest (Serrano1), 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
62. Id. at 1244.
63. "Horizontal equity" and "vertical equity" theories focused on de facto
equalization of funds and proportional spending, respectively. The concept of
"horizontal equity" in school finance rests on the notion that "all equally
situated children should be treated equally." See Berne & Stiefel, supra note
57, at 18. Arthur Wise, an advocate for "horizontal equity," drew from both
desegregation and reapportionment cases arguing that education is a
fundamental right that cannot be abridged without a compelling state interest.
See Minorini & Sugarman, School Finance, supra note 55, at 36. In contrast to
"horizontal equity," "vertical equity" recognized that children throughout the
state have different needs and accordingly, should be treated differently. See id.
(explaining that under a vertical equity theory, "equally" meeting the
educational needs of both rich and poor students would require unequal
spending on a needs basis in order to avoid a constitutional violation); see also
Berne, supra note 57, at 20-21.
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neutrality."6 4
The "wealth neutrality" theory, developed in Private
Wealth and Public Education,6 5 was adopted by what would
become known as the "Coons Team"--a law school professor
at Northwestern University and his two students.6 Under
the Coons Team's strategy "fiscal neutrality" was created
through reapportionment of local funds, but the approach did
not stop wealthier districts from taxing themselves to an
additional extent once the primary funds were reallocated.6
The reapportionment, or "district power equalizing," theory
would allow the state to "constructively equalize" the property
tax revenues from the different locales, but left further
decisions regarding taxing and spending on education to local
control.6
This recognition of local control was a particularly
important aspect of the policy, given that the Coons Team
expected that the federal courts would be apprehensive to
infringe upon the traditional local control of education.6 9 As
in other matters such as the right to vote, the right to obtain
a divorce, or the right of criminal appeal, the Coons Team
sought to garner constitutional attention for the grave
disparities between wealthy and poor districts under the
school financing scheme.7 °
Adopting the fiscal neutrality theory, the California
Supreme Court in Serrano I struck down the California public
school financing scheme.7 1 The court held that a financing
scheme based on property tax was a violation of both the
Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution, and the
state constitution's equal protection clause.72
Under the
State's prior scheme, the "flat grant" was adjusted through

64. See Berne & Stiefel, supra note 57, at 16.
65. Id.

at

17

(citing COONS

ET AL.,

PRIVATE

WEALTH

AND PUBLIC

EDUCATION (Harvard University Press) (1970)).
66. See Minorini & Sugarman, EducationalAdequacy, supra note 55, at 181;
Minorini & Sugarman, School Finance,supra note 55, at 37.
67. See Minorini & Sugarman, School Finance, supra note 55, at 38.
68. See Minorini & Sugarman, Educational Adequacy, supra note 55, at
184-85.
69. See Minorini & Sugarman, School Finance,supra note 55, at 38.
70. See Minorini & Sugarman, EducationalAdequacy, supra note 55, at 181.
71. Serrano v. Priest (SerranoI), 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
72. Id. at 1249 n.11 ("The complaint also alleges that the financing system
violates article I, sections 11 and 21, of the California Constitution ....
[O]ur
analysis of plaintiffs' federal equal protection contention is also applicable to
their claim under these state constitutional provisions."); see infra Part I.
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additional aid,73 yet funding for local school districts was still
primarily based on local property taxes. 4 This funding plan
resulted in grave disparity. For example, in Serrano I, the
Court juxtaposed a locality that spent $577.49 per pupil in
Baldwin Hills, California with a local district that spent
$1,231.72 per pupil in Beverly Hills, California.75 The court
held that wealth was a suspect classification and asserted
that the public school "funding scheme invidiously
discriminate[d] against the poor because it ma[de] the quality
of a child's education a function of the wealth of his parents
and neighbors. 7' 6
The court also held that education is a fundamental
interest. It declared that education is integral to compete in
the economic marketplace, is universally relevant, continues
over a long period of time, and is influential in shaping the
personality of the youth of society. Shortly after the Serrano
I decision, Minnesota, Texas, New Jersey, Kansas, and
Arizona followed suit and found their respective school
financing schemes in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution. 79 However, this growing model of
success turned out to be transient.
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court's San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez8 0 decision effectively
closed the door on school district finance challenges under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. l Although
the Court recognized "the grave significance of education both
to the individual and to our society,"8 2 it held that wealth is
not a suspect classification and education is not a

73. This included both equalization aid distributed in inverse proportion to
the wealth of the districts and additional supplemental aid available to
subsidize particular poor school districts that were willing to make an extra
local tax effort. Serrano 1, 487 P.2d at 1247.
74. See id.

75. Id. at 1248.
76. Id. at 1244.
77. Id. The court characterized this "fundamental interest" by noting that
"education is the lifeline of both the individual and society." Id. at 1256.
78. Serrano v. Priest (SerranoI), 487 P.2d 1241, 1258-59 (Cal. 1971).
79.

JOEL S. BERKE,

ANSWERS TO INEQUITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE NEW

SCHOOL FINANCE 17 (1974).
80. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).

81. Id.
82. Id. at 30.
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fundamental interest recognized by the U.S. Constitution. 3
Consequently, this decision foreclosed, with one possible
exception, 4 any claim under the Federal Constitution.
As a result, litigation shifted to the states and their
respective constitutions. In Serrano v. Priest (Serrano i!),"5
the California Supreme Court affirmed that it relied on both
the State and Federal Equal Protection Clauses in Serrano I
and upheld the decision as one based on its own state
constitution. 8 Likewise, advocates in other states continued
to employ the Coons Team approach under state
constitutions.87 However, such claims required that the state
choose to interpret the equal protection clauses of its state
constitution similarly to the California clauses in Serrano I
and III' and dissimilarly to the federal clause, a decision some
courts chose not to make.8 9 Accordingly, advocates began to

83. See id. at 37-40.

84. Id. at 36-37. The potential exception indicated in the opinion reads:
"Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a
constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either [the
right to speak or the right to vote], we have no indication that the present levels
of educational expenditures .

.

. provide an education that falls short ....

[N]o

charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each child with an
opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of
the rights of speech and of full participation in the political process." Id. at 37;
MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 796 (4th ed. 2002)
(quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)); see also
Trifiletti, supra note 2, at 981 (noting the potential right to 'minimally adequate
education").
85. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano11), 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976).
86. YUDOF ETAL., supra note 84, at 798.
87. See Minorini & Sugarman, EducationalAdequacy, supra note 55, at 183.
88. Id.
89. See Minorini & Sugarman, EducationalAdequacy, supra note 55, at 183.
Furthermore, even where litigation under equal protection claims succeeded,
fundamental educational needs were still not being met through "equalization"
of funding. Id. Advocates began to look at issues that:
"the earlier writings had acknowledged but had put aside: (1)
some districts (especially urban districts) faced higher costs than
others (for example, the higher cost of living in cities required
paying higher wages to employees and higher prices for goods);
(2) some districts (especially urban districts) had relatively more
pupils with exceptional educational needs and so, in some sense,
needed more money in order to educate them; and (3) some
districts (especially urban districts) had to provide so many other
local services that their tax base was not really as available to be
drawn on for education as would appear from a simple
calculation of local district capacity (e.g., assessed value per
pupil)." Id. at 183-84.
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look to the education clauses that are present in many state
constitutions as grounds for a legal claim.
2.

Move to an Adequacy Focus

Starting in 1989, the focus on school finance equity began
to shift to a right of educational adequacy. 90 Adequacy was
an appealing, strategic approach given that it was based on
direct constitutional commands, general societal agreement
that students should have at least "basic" educational
necessities, and avoided some of the complexities of equal
protection claims. 91 In Rose v. Council for Better Education,
Inc.,92 the Kentucky Supreme Court struck down the entire
State financing plan under the State Constitution, which
requires the State to "provide an efficient system of common
schools throughout the state."93 The court then outlined
minimum required characteristics9 4 and educational goals 9 5 in
order to comport with the constitutional mandate that
schooling must be "efficient."9 6
Abbott v. Burke9 7 provided another landmark decision
that was based on both equity and adequacy principles.98
Importantly, the court in Abbott looked at more than just
money. The court evaluated disparities between the richest
and poorest districts in the state, focusing on areas such as
exposure to computers, science education, foreign language
programs, music programs, art programs, industrial arts,

90. Minorini & Sugarman, EducationalAdequacy, supra note 55, at 183.
91. See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School
FinanceReform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 170 (1995).
92. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
93. Id. at 189.
94. Id. at 212-13. The court characterized an "efficient" system of common
schools as free, available to all children regardless of residential or economic
status, substantially uniform, monitored by the state, and funded to provide an
adequate education that endeavors to attain goals of providing students with
certain enumerated capacities. Id.
95. Id. at 212. In asserting that adequate education is a fundamental right
under the Kentucky Constitution, the court advanced seven capacities that
states should endeavor to bestow on its students, including oral and written
skills to function in society, skills necessary to make informed choices, skills
necessary to understand issues that affect society, sufficient self-knowledge,
sufficient exposure to the arts, sufficient training to make intelligent decisions

about life work and skills to compete in the job market. Id.
96. Id. at 189.
97. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
98. Id.
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The Abbott court
physical education, and facilities.99
indicated that "thorough and efficient" education included
"the ability to participate fully in society, in the life of one's
community, the ability to appreciate music, art, and
literature, and the ability to share all of that with friends."10 0
Although the court did not require state-wide equalization
efforts in an attempt to meet its aims, it did mandate that the
richest and poorest districts "begin at the same starting
line" 10 1 with the recognition that poorer urban districts may
require additionalfinancial backing. 10 2 Although major shifts
to the adequacy approach took place across America, the
embrace and arguable success of such an approach has not
been so forthcoming in California where the Serrano decision
led the State down a different path.
D. School Finance Policy in CaliforniaPost-Serrano
After the California Supreme Court's Serrano I decision,
which held that the State's property tax-based school
financing system violated the state constitution's equal
protection clause, the State Legislature endeavored to remedy
The Bill allotted
the violation through Senate Bill 90.'1°
additional aid to districts with low property tax revenue and
imposed restraints, which voters could override, on spending
among wealthier districts.0 4 In Serrano II, the court not only
affirmed the lower court's finding that there was a violation of
the equal protection clause under the state constitution
notwithstanding the federal decision in Rodriguez,10 but it
also made clear that the efforts under Senate Bill 90 were

99. Id at 395-97.
100. Id. at 397.
101. Id. at 403.
102. Id. at 402 ("It is clear to us that in order to achieve the constitutional
standard for the student from these poorer urban districts-the ability to
function in that society entered by their relatively advantaged peers-the
totality of the districts' educational offering must contain elements over and
above those found in the affluent suburban district."). After the 1990 decision,
the State Legislature and the State Supreme Court began another dialogue that
culminated in the court itself setting forth various standards for the state's
education reform. Such measures ranged from safe, sanitary, and sufficient
facilities to enhanced technology. See YUDOF ET AL., supra note 84, at 836-37.
103. William A. Fischel, How Serrano Caused Proposition 13, 12 J.L. & POL.
607, 610 (1997).
104. Id. at 610-11.
105. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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constitutionally insufficient. 10 6 The court instead adopted the
lower court's remedy requiring that, within six years, there
must not be a disparity greater than $100 per pupil
10 7
expenditure if the difference was the result of property tax.
In response to Serrano II, the California Legislature
passed Assembly Bill 65, which called for more aid to
property-poor districts, additional restrictions on wealthy
districts, and reallocation of property-tax revenue from
wealthy districts to poorer districts.0 8 Before Assembly Bill
65 could take effect, Proposition 13 passed requiring a
property tax cap at one percent of the property's fair market
value. 10 9 In addition, tax rates could only increase at two
percent per year, any "special taxes" had to be approved by a
two-thirds vote of the electors, and any increase in state taxes
required a two-thirds vote of each legislature." 0 As a result
of the property tax limitation, California was required to "bail
out" school districts with state budget surplus."' Together,
the passage of (i) Senate Bill 154, which distributed revenue
in proportion to prior property-tax revenue, (ii) Assembly Bill
8, which distributed aid to low-spending districts designed to
equalize wealthy and poor district spending, and (iii)
Proposition 4, which set forth spending limits, greatly
narrowed the disparity gap in school district spending." 2 In
Serrano v. Priest (Serrano III),"1 3 the court held that
equalization fulfilled the mandate of Serrano II, once any
shortcomings of the $100 benchmark were adjusted for
inflation.14 However, as Professor William Fischel remarked,
although the goal of equal spending was achieved, after
Proposition 13, the goal was met by greatly reducing
15
spending all together.
As adequacy lawsuits were gaining success throughout
the nation," 6 after 1986, challenges to California's financing
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
at 390.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See Serrano v. Priest (SerranoII), 557 P.2d 929, 939, 953 (Cal. 1976).
See Fischel, supra note 103; see also YUDOF ET AL., supra note 84, at 798.
See Fischel, supra note 103, at 611.
Id. at 612.
YUDOF ETAL., supra note 84, at 798.
Id.
See YUDOF ET AL., supra note 84, at 798; see also Lockard, supra note 12,
Serrano v. Priest (Serrano111), 226 Cal. Rptr. 584 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
YUDOF ETAL., supra note 84, at 798-99.
Fischel, supra note 103, at 613.
See supra Part II.C.2.

2008]

FROM THE PROXY TO THE PRINCIPAL

723

system generally subsided. 117 However, the equalization
efforts under the Serrano decisions appeared to have failed to
afford some students, especially minority and low-income
students, access to an education equal to students living in
more affluent areas throughout the state or even minimally
adequate resources to attain any education. 1 8 The horrific
tales of the Williams plaintiffs shed valuable light on the
inadequacies of the "equal" funding scheme as implemented
in California.
The Case of Williams v. California
Plaintiffs in Williams v. California took action on May
17, 2000, the forty-sixth anniversary of Brown v. Board of
Education."9 The Williams class action lawsuit 120 alleged
that tens of thousands of California children were being
"deprived of basic educational opportunities" and were forced
The
to attend schools that "shock the conscience."' 2 '
Complaint asserted that these schools were "overwhelmingly
populated by low-income and non-white students and
students who [were] still learning the English language." 22
The description of dramatically substandard conditions
detailed in the Complaint, paired with the fact that almost all
the original plaintiffs were minorities, 23 evidence a sad
conclusion: Equal funding has not succeeded in bringing
many California students closer to an equal educational
opportunity.
The Williams litigation focused on three primary areas of
inequality and inadequacy: (i) instructional materials, (ii)
1.

117. See Lockard, supra note 12, at 402.
118. See id. at 403-04; see generally FAC, supra note 6.
119. See Lockard, supra note 12, at 403; see also Decentschools.org, Williams
at
1,
2005
April
Highlights
Settlement
http://decentschools.orgsettlementlWilliams-Highlights-April-2005.pdf.
120. The original class was eventually amended to include all students who
were or would be attending public elementary school, middle school, and
secondary school and had been deprived of a basic educational necessity. See
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Class Certification, No. 31-2236 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 23, 2001), available at
Order Granting Motion to
http//www.decentschools.org/court-papers.php;
Certify a Class, No. 31-2236 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 1, 2001), available at
http://www.decentschools.org/court-papers.php; see also Lockard, supra note 12,
at 403 (detailing the changes in status).
121. See FAC, supra note 6, at 6.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 7.
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school facilities, and (iii) qualified teachers. To highlight the
lack of educational resources, the plaintiffs maintained that
in many cases they did not have a textbook to bring home to
study and complete homework assignments, 2 4 and had to
"rely on illegible or incomplete photocopies" 112 out of "science
books so old that their content is now known to be false, or on
social studies and economic texts describing persons long
departed from politics as current American leaders." 26 Some
students were even required to pay for materials in core
subjects. 127 In at least one school, the school provided no
books in fundamental subjects such as English and history. 121
In sum, not only were materials inadequate for purposes of
learning relevant and accurate information, but there were
also situations where students were receiving no books at
129
all.
Overcrowding and the "slum conditions"1 30 of the school
facilities served to exacerbate California students' lack of
appropriate learning materials. The plaintiffs, many of whom
were required to attend school by California law,13 ' described
the appalling state of the facilities of these schools at which
they spent numerous hours each day. The students described
situations where thirty seats were available for sixty-five
students, 132 or where classroom instruction took place in
rooms shared with other classes. 133 In one school, a total of
six filthy restroom stalls served to accommodate all the
females at a 2000-person school.13 4 The school facilities were
overcrowded and severely dilapidated. Plaintiffs recounted
instances of vermin infestation, inadequate heating and
35
cooling, leaking roofs, and filthy bathroom facilities.
The plaintiffs also stressed the lack of qualified teachers.
The plaintiffs pointed out that, according to the California
124. Id. at 8-9.
125. Id. at 8.
126. Id.
127. See FAC, supra note 6, at 9.
128. See id. at 42.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 9.
131. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 (Deering 2003) (setting forth that children in
California are required to attend full-time education from age six to eighteen).
132. FAC, supra note 6, at 31.
133. Id. at 10.
134. Id. at 31.
135. See generally id.
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Department of Education, in at least 100 of California's
schools only fifty percent of teachers had full teaching
credentials.136 Many of these schools had largely minority
and/or poor student populations. 13 7 Sadly, such findings
occurred at a time when the Governor of California
announced that having a "first-rate teacher for every
classroom, in every school, in every neighborhood" 138 is a
"vital ingredient" to "regain[ing] [California's] former
prominence." 3 9
On the basis of the dismal state of California public
education, particularly for those economically disadvantaged
or minority students, the plaintiffs in Williams asserted
violations of the equal protection and education clauses of the
The right to equal protection
California Constitution. 140
asserted in the California Constitution" requires that "[a]
person . . .not be . . .denied equal protection of the laws"'
and that "[a] citizen or class of citizens . . . not be granted
privileges or immunities not granted on the same terms to all
citizens.' ' 3
Furthermore, the California Constitution
mandates that "[aill laws of a general nature have uniform
Since California's jurisprudence expressly
operation.""'
recognized wealth as a suspect class and education as a
fundamental interest,14 the plaintiffs brought their claim
asserting that the stark disparities between public schools
within the state, with a disproportionate number of
minorities attending substandard schools, "offend[] the core

136. Id. at 58. In some cases, only thirteen percent of teachers had full
teaching credentials. Id.
137. See id. at 6-7; see also Lockard, supra note 12, at 403.
138. See FAC, supra note 6, at 62.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 70-74. The causes of action set forth in the First Amendment
Complaint were: (1) violation of the equal protection clauses of the California
Constitution; (2) violation of article IX, sections 1 and 5 of the California
Constitution (education clauses); (3) violation of the due process clauses of the
California Constitution, article I, sections 7(a) and 15; (4) violation of Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and (5) violation of California Education Code
Section 51004. Id.
141. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7; CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 16(a).
142. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
143. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(b) (emphasis added).
144. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 16(a).
145. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano 1), 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); see also
Trifiletti, supra note 2.
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constitutional principle of equality." 4 6
Interestingly, like many other advocates around the
country in prior years, the Williams plaintiffs also argued
that education is a right granted under the State constitution.
The plaintiffs pointed to two education clauses of the
California Constitution as the basis of their claim: article IX,
sections I and 5.147 Article IX, section 1 states that "[a]
general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence" 14 is
"essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the
people." 4 9 Additionally, this section mandates that the
"Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the
promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural
improvement." 150 Section 5 mandates that the "Legislature
shall provide for a system of common schools by which a free
school shall be kept up and supported .
".1.."51 Although
claims in California generally have been based on the equal
protection clauses as in the Serrano case, the California
Supreme Court had never concluded that a fundamental right
to education did not exist. 5 2 Thus, the plaintiffs urged that
the two clauses read together created an actionable right to
5
education. 1
The plaintiffs relied on various California court decisions
to bolster their contention. In particular, the plaintiffs cited a
court of appeals decision, Slayton v. Pomona Unified School
District,' that specifically stated that "California has
extended the right to an education by virtue of two
constitutional
provisions, one calling for legislative
encouragement of education and the other requiring the
[L]egislature to create a system of 'free schools' in each

146. See FAC, supra note 6, at 11.
147. Id. at 70.
148. CAL. CONST. art IX, § 1.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5.
152. See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano 1), 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); see also
Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant State of California's Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings as to Second Cause of Action in First Amended Complaint, No.
31-2236
(Cal.
Super.
Ct.
June
9,
2003),
available
at
http://www.decentschools.org/court-papers.php [hereinafter Opposition].
153. See Opposition, supra note 152, at 2.
154. Slayton v. Pomona Unified Sch. Dist., 207 Cal. Rptr. 705, 711-12 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1984).
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district of the state."155 Additionally, the plaintiffs juxtaposed
the California Constitution with the constitutions of four
other states that had very similar education clauses and
under which the respective states found an actionable right to
156
education.
Nevertheless, the court rejected the argument under the
education clauses, holding that the clauses under article IX
were not self-executing. 15 7 Further, the court pointed out that
the violation alleged by the plaintiffs was not that particular
schools were not providing adequate learning tools, but rather
that the State had violated its duty of oversight and
management of the public school system.158 Thus, although
the court did make the determination that sections one and
five are not self-executing but rather "directed on their faces
to legislative action,"'5 9 arguably a large part of its decision to
dismiss the cause of action under the education clauses was
based on the litigation strategy of the plaintiffs. 6 ' Given that
the case later settled, however, the validity of the plaintiffs'
claim under the education clauses was not adjudicated by the
California Supreme Court, and as of 2006, leaves a possible
entree for future litigation under these clauses.16 '
As
discussed below, this avenue for litigation could prove to be a
particularly helpful vehicle to integrate international human
rights norms into education policy.
2. The Settlement of Williams v. California
On August 13, 2004, over four years after the initial suit
was filed, the parties to Williams v. California announced a

155. Opposition, supra note 152, at 2.
156. See id. at 8-9. The comparable education clauses were drawn from the
state constitutions of New York, North Carolina, South Carolina and Tennessee.

Id.
157. See Order Granting Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Second
Cause of Action at 3-7, No. 31-2236 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 10, 2003), available at
http://www.decentschools.org/court.papers.php
[hereinafter Order].
A selfexecuting law is defined as a law that is "immediately effective without further
action,
legislation
or
legal
steps."
Law.com,
http://dictionary.law.com/default2.asp?typed=self-executing&type= 1
(last
visited Feb. 13, 2008).
158. Order, supra note 157, at 1-2.
159. See id. at 3.
160. See id. at 2; see also Lockard, supra note 12.
161. See generally Order, supra note 157; see also Lockard, supra note 12, at
414; Trifiletti, supra note 2.
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Settlement Agreement. 162 On September 29, 2004, Governor
Schwarzenegger signed into law five bills implementing the
legislative proposal of the Settlement Agreement. 163 The
settlement legislation includes Assembly Bill 1550, which
sets forth a scheduling scheme to phase out "Track 6" yearround schools by the year 2012.6 Such a system results in a
disjointed, off-and-on academic year that deprives students of
over a full year of school instruction by the time he or she
165
graduates from high school.
The settlement legislation also addresses the issue of
teachers in Assembly Bill 3001, which generally seeks to
develop the existing mechanism to establish that teachers are
qualified to teach the courses they are instructing, including
those assigned to teach English learners. 6 6
It also
encourages hiring of qualified teachers in low-performing
schools and effectuates an efficient system that allows
qualified teachers from out-of-state access to jobs in
167
California public schools.
In addition, Senate Bill 550 and Assembly Bill 2727
generally include standards for minimally adequate
instructional materials, school facilities, and teacher
quality. 168
Importantly, the bills in part established a
"uniform complaint" system to provide a method of reporting
a school's failure to meet these standards as part of a more
comprehensive monitoring scheme. 169
Specifically, Senate
162. Decentschools.org, Williams Settlement Highlights - April 2005 at 1,
http://decentschools.org/settlementIWilliamsHighlightsApril2005.pdf.
163. Order Regarding Approval of Settlement Notice and Schedule at Exhibit
A, at 2, No. 31-2236 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 2004), available at
http://www.decentschools.org/settlement.php
[hereinafter Order Regarding
Approval].
164. Id. at Exhibit A, at 2. "Track 6" year-round schools are designed to
address overcrowding in schools by putting groups of students on rotating block
schedules throughout the year, instead of attending classes continuously for a
nine-month term. See EXPERT REPORT, supra note 10, at 10.
165. EXPERT REPORT, supra note 10, at 47 ("[Olver the course of a 12-year
public education, the loss of 17 instructional days a year results in the loss of
204 instructional days - significantly more than an entire school year.").
166. See Order Regarding Approval, supra note 163, at Exhibit A, at 2-3.
167. Id. at Exhibit A, at 2.
168. Id.
169. BROOKS M. ALLEN, THE WILLIAMS V. CALIFORNIA SETTLEMENT: THE
FIRST

YEAR

OF

IMPLEMENTATION

34

http://www.decentschools.org/settlement/WilliamsReportWeb2005.pdf;
Koski, supra note 2.

(2005),

see also
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Bill 550, as amended by Assembly Bill 831, requires that
"each pupil, including English learners, has a standardsaligned textbook or instructional materials, or both, to use in
The settlement legislation
class and to take home." 17 0
specially set aside $138 million for new instructional
materials in addition to regular funding for students at
schools ranked by the Academic Performance Index (API) to
be in the bottom three deciles. 17 1 Further, Senate Bill 6
provides for $800 million to address problems with poor
facilities and $25 million proportioned to the bottom three
deciles under the API for facility needs. 17 2 Under the
legislation, as amended by Senate Bill 607 effective January
1, 2007,171 schools must be in "good repair," defined as
requiring that "the facility is maintained in a manner that
assures that it is clean, safe, and functional."1 74 Despite the
immediate benefits listed above and other unmentioned
benefits of the legislation, its reach is limited in scope and
sustainability.
III. PROBLEM: SHORT-TERM SOLUTION

A look at the extremely unacceptable conditions of many
of California's schools, attended by a disproportionate number
of minority and impoverished children, confirms that the
general aims of Serrano, no doubt affected by subsequent
legislation, are not presently met. The litigation in Williams
ended with a settlement replete with mandatory measures
promulgated to provide an "equal educational opportunity"
for all students. However, even with the legislative measures
taken to employ the Settlement Agreement of Williams, once
the grant to low-income schools is spent and the bare
minimum level of texts, teachers, and safe buildings provided,

170. Assem. B. 831, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005); S.B. 550, 20032004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004).
171. S.B. 550, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004); see also Order
Regarding Approval, supra note 163, at Exhibit A, at 2.
172. Order Regarding Approval, supra note 163, at Exhibit A, at 3; see also
ALLEN, supra note 11, at 10.
173. Decentschools.org, Williams v. California Legislative Update: AB 607,
http://www.decentschools.org/settlement/Williams-Legislative-UpdateAB607.p
df (last visited Feb. 13, 2008).
174. S.B. 550, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004); Williams Settlement
Highlights, supra note 9; Williams v. California Legislative Update: AB 607,
supra note 173.
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what will be the residual effect of the settlement? Will it
appear to an outsider that California's children have "equal
educational opportunities?" More importantly, will insiders
actually realize "equal educational opportunities?"
There is no doubt that extra money and resources are
necessary and welcome. The legislation under the settlement
aimed at bolstering transparency through monitoring is
particularly beneficial and promises long-term benefits. 175 It
is unsettling, however, that only selected variableseducation-are
for meaningful
admittedly important
addressed. The Williams legislation's focus on specific inputs
as limited indicators of "education," may in effect ignore a
broader range of tools necessary to achieve equal or even
Without government measures that
adequate education.
more comprehensively and deliberately address, through
legislation and/or judicial interpretation, whether or not all
students have access to a meaningful education, only time
will tell how effective this legislation will be at providing an
equal education to all of California's children.
IV. ANALYSIS: How HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS CAN HELP
Equalization of funding, supplemental aid, and grants
are various ways to try to solve complex socioeconomic issues
by writing a check. Although money is the necessary fuel of
any policy implementation, the goal of education policy
should remain centered on providing a child with an
"education," rather than merely on spending enough,
spending equally, or even providing certain educational
inputs. A quality education should be assessed qualitatively,
not quantitatively. 176 Mere resource equalization, even if
successful, may further result in "equally bad" public

175. See Koski, supra note 2.
176. The National Economic and Social Rights Initiative has emphasized the
qualitative nature of a rights-based approach in that it states that a "human
right to education guarantees every child access to quality schools and services
without discrimination . . . [and] must be aimed at developing each child's
personality and abilities to his or her fullest potential . . . ." National Economic
& Social Rights Initiative, Human Right to Education Info Sheet no.1,
http://nesri.org/fact sheets-pubs/Right%20to%2OEducation.pdf (last visited Feb.
13, 2008). The National Economic and Social Rights Initiative further contends
that inequities in education, opportunity, and resources reflect "systemic
violations of the right to a quality education." Id.
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education 17 7 and this problem is even more pronounced if, as
some believe, children with access to additional funds opt to
attend private schools.17 Subsection A will first discuss the
benefits of using human rights concepts in California's
education finance policy. 179 Subsequently, subsection B will
examine the shortcomings of the Williams legislation and will
discuss how a human rights focus may better frame the
problem and ultimately lead to a more effective and lasting

solution. 180
A. Human Right to Education
The remedy for infringement on a human right to
education is not limited to the provision of resources, but is
more holistic.
Particularly, under the ICESCR, and as
mentioned above,8 " there are four "essential features" of
education: availability, accessibility, acceptability, and
adaptability.8 2 The availability feature requires that there
be enough educational facilities and course offerings for
students.18 3 The accessibility aspect mandates that facilities
and courses be offered to all and be accessible physically,
economically,
and
without
discrimination.1 84
The
acceptability feature generally requires that the substance of
education be acceptable to the student, subject to Statedeveloped minimum educational standards .185 Finally, the
adaptability characteristic entails education that is flexible
and based on student needs in various settings. 86 In aiming
to protect a right to education, these "essential features" and
other norms will likely come closer to achieving long-term,
meaningful education than will measures taken to equalize
funding or to provide selected inputs some believe to be
representative of student education.
Although the adequacy approach taken in other U.S.
177. See Fischel, supra note 103, at 613.
178. Race, Economics, and Education Workshop, Class Discussion, Santa
Clara University School of Law (Fall 2006).
179. See infra Part V.A.
180. See infra Part IV.B.
181. See infra Part II.A.
182. See The Right to Education,supra note 21, 6(a)-(d).
183. Id. at 6(a).
184. Id. at 6(b).
185. Id. at T 6(c).
186. Id. at T 6(d).
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jurisdictions may provide a promising opportunity to
integrate human rights norms through constitutional
construction and legislation to comport with "adequacy"
requirements,8 7 the California Supreme Court has not, as of
2006, decided if there is an actionable right to adequate
education under the California Constitution's education
clauses.'
However, despite the absence of legal precedent
under an adequacy theory, education rights advocates can
look to local implementation of education policy based on
human rights concepts to address issues of educational
quality, equal education opportunity, and overcrowding.
These issues are those that arguably the Williams legislation
does not adequately address. Moreover, use of concepts from
such international instruments locally can lay the foundation
for more systemic changes to California's school finance policy
at a state level.
B. Shortcomings of the Williams Legislation and Use of the
CRC and the ICESCR
1.

InstructionalResources and Facilities

The Williams settlement focuses on transparency and, in
large part, the provision of resources. 8 9 Senate Bill 550
requires that "each pupil, including English learners, has a
standards-aligned textbook or instruction materials, or both,
to use in class and to take home." 9 ° Furthermore, the
legislation sets up an accountability system to enforce the
standards, repeals a sunset clause of annual budget funding
for instructional materials, and allots $138 million for the
provision of instructional materials in schools that, in 2003,
ranked in the bottom two deciles on the Academic

187. Importantly, if children are found to be entitled to an adequate
education under the education clauses of the California Constitution, it will be
up to both California's courts to determine how "adequate" is defined through
constitutional construction, and California's lawmakers to effectuate a plan to
achieve such adequacy. It is at this policy-making stage that the adoption of
international human rights norms can play a particularly forceful role in the

future of education for California's children.
188. See generally Order, supra note 157; see also Lockard, supra note 12, at
414; Trifiletti, supra note 2.
189. See Koski, supra note 2.
190. See ALLEN, supra note 11.
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Performance Index (API).19 1 The legislation also addresses
school facilities. 192 The legislation defines the standard of
"good repair" as when "the facility is maintained in a manner
that assures that it is clean, safe, and functional." 9 3
Additionally, the Williams legislation provides an $800
million fund for facility repair where conditions present
serious health and safety concerns and $25 million to assess
1 94
the facilities needs of decile 1-3 schools.
Although access to education materials and facilities that
are in "good repair" is essential to a child's education, more
must be demanded. Access to books does not necessarily
guarantee equal education in the state or a quality education
for every child.
Even in conjunction with instructional
materials, the provision of a minimally adequate facility for
children while in school does not in and of itself render the
goals of education fulfilled. Thus, despite norms pertaining to
books, teachers, and buildings and the settlement's funding
allotments, 195 which may, however, be offset by other budget
cuts, 96 the settlement stops short of assuring all students a
meaningful education.
Human rights norms, like those asserted in the ICESCR
and the CRC, will provide a more lasting, holistic framework
for achieving educational opportunity by focusing on the
development of the child's capabilities.' 9 7 Human rights
norms would require further effort, beyond a provision of
selected basic resources and allocation of funds, when the goal
of providing a meaningful education demands it.
For
example, under the ICESCR, education policy should aim to
fully develop the human personality.' 9 The CRC specifies
that education should be aimed at developing the "child's
personality" 99 and developing the full potential of his or her

191. Id. at 10-14.
192. See id.
193. Id. at 20.
194. Id. at 10-11.
195. S.B. 550, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004).
196. See Lockard, supra note 12, at 413 ("The settlement benefits are also
offset by losses of other funding that education advocates claim they are owed
under Proposition 98 and a deal reached with Governor Schwarzenegger in
2004.").
197. See The Aims of Education,supra note 8.
198. See ICESCR, supra note 32.
199. See CRC, supra note 44, at 54.
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The focus
"talents and mental and physical abilities.""'
under the international framework is appropriately on the
child's individual right to the development that education
permits.
Resources should be only the means to realize
educational opportunity for all children, not the end. Under
the CRC, education "goes far beyond formal schooling to
embrace the broad range of life experiences and learning
processes which enable children . . . to develop their
personalities, talents and abilities and to live a full and
The Williams settlement
satisfying life within society."2"'
stresses the importance of providing textbooks, safe facilities,
and qualified teachers, °2 however, the CRC requires
accessibility to the means of acquiring education and the
development of "critical thinking, creative talents, and other
abilities which give children the tools needed to pursue their
Additionally, under the ICESCR
options in life."20 3
"adaptability" feature, "education has to be flexible so it can
adapt to the needs of changing societies and communities and
respond to the needs of students within their diverse social
and cultural settings. "204 Although the Williams legislation
provides for select basic tools, there is no way of knowing for
sure that those selected resources will be essential, or even
helpful, in an increasingly hi-tech, computerized, and global
world. Thus, policy born from a human rights approach
would not only look to the inputs provided, but would require
evaluating the quality of the education in a more nuanced,
specific, and comprehensive manner.
2. Overcrowding
The Williams settlement does not do enough to cure
overcrowding. Although Assembly Bill 1550 requires the
phasing out of Concept 6 year-round schooling by 2012,205 the
overcrowding problems in non-Concept 6 schools may still
persist. Specifically, the Concept 6 multi-track system is a
year-round school calendar that consists of "three tracks
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id.
See The Aims of Education, supra note 8, 2.
See supra Part II.D.2.
The Aims of Education,supra note 8, 9.
See The Right to Education, supra note 21, 6(d).
Assem. B. 1550, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004).
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[that] rotate throughout the school year, with two tracks in
session at any given time and a third on vacation."2 °6 General
multi-track systems are implemented as a response to
overcrowding in order to provide additional capacity.2 °7 The
Concept 6 school calendar differs from other multi-track
school calendar systems in that it provides for the maximum
amount of capacity. 0 8 As a consequence of this "maximum
capacity" plan, students who attend such schools over the
course of their twelve-year schooling will be deprived of over a
year of school. 0 9
Although the Assembly Bill requires schools using the
Concept 6 calendar to develop a plan to phase out its use by
2012,210 it specifically upholds other multi-track calendar
schemes that may not reduce overcrowding, 21 1 and may even
result in more overcrowding.2 12 This problem is especially
alarming for a child's prospects of obtaining education when
an expert report for the plaintiffs in Williams indicated that
overcrowding "negatively affects many classroom activities,
instructional strategies, and academic performance."213
Under the ICESCR framework, a child's right to
education includes "availability."2 4 Under the framework,
"functioning educational institutions ... have to be available
in sufficient quantity within the jurisdiction. 2 5
Thus,
arguably, a child's right to education demands that he or she
not be forced to attend school on the piecemeal basis that the
multi-track system offers because there is not enough
"availability" to attend school on a regular calendar. The
human rights norm that education be "available in sufficient
quantity" could be used in California to mandate that having
an overcrowded classroom, even short of the extreme
situations in Williams,21 6 is unacceptable.
206. See EXPERT REPORT, supra note 10, at 10.

207. See id. at 2.
208. Id. at 11-12.
209. Id. at 47.
210. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 37682(a) (Deering 2003); Assem. B. 1550, 2003-2004
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004).
211. See EXPERT REPORT, supra note 10, at 16.

212. See id. at 17.
213. Id.
214. The Right to Education,supra note 21, 6(a).
215. Id. (emphasis added).
216. See FAC, supra note 6, at 31 (pointing out an instance where there were
only thirty seats for sixty-five students).
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Moreover, a broader human rights norm that demands
that education be economically accessible to all without
discrimination in law and fact 17 could require additional
monitoring of students attending overcrowded schools and
additional focus on potential remedies for stark disparities
inhibiting the realization of meaningful education for groups
of students. The phasing out of the Concept 6 multi-track
school year calendar is important; in 2006, the Los Angeles
Unified School District had already proposed a plan to
construct new schools and thereafter was required to submit
annual reports of its progress.218 Yet, more must be done for
the students who will still attend overcrowded schools that
have not utilized Concept 6 programs.
V.

PROPOSAL AND IMPLEMENTATION: LOCAL LAW AND

POLICYMAKING GUIDELINES

Although only the Federal Government has the authority
to sign treaties,219 general human rights norms embodied
within the unratified CRC and ICESCR can be implemented
locally. There are two important examples of local legislation
that serve as valuable resources in drafting education
legislation that integrate international human rights norms.
First, San Francisco implemented the United Nations
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) by way of city ordinance in 1998.220

Second, the New York City Human Rights Initiative has
proposed, but not yet enacted, legislation that combines
human rights principles from CEDAW and the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)
to further augment its anti-discrimination laws. 22' These two

examples will be particularly helpful guides in drafting local
legislation in California based on concepts from both the CRC
and ICESCR.
Not only are there examples from which to draw
217. The Right to Education, supra note 21, 6 (emphasis added).
218. See Order Regarding Approval, supra note 163, at Exhibit A, at 3; see
also ALLEN, supra note 11, at 30.
219. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
220. See Women's Institute for Leadership Development for Human Rights,
http://www.wildforhumanrights.org/ourwork/cedaw.html (last visited Feb. 13,
2008).
221. About
the
New
York
City
Human
Rights
Initiative,
http://www.nychri.org (last visited Feb. 13, 2008).
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technical guidance in incorporating human rights policy,
there are two important benefits to implementing legislation
that combines the human rights principles of the CRC and
ICESCR on a local level: the possibility of an immediate,
positive effect on public education and its potential long-term
impact on education policy. First, local adoption of concepts
from the CRC and ICESCR via city ordinances arguably
would be an effective tool in large, economically diverse cities.
It would allow for a more comprehensive focus on whether
children are actually being educated in the varying schools in
the jurisdiction. Local policy constructed using concepts from
international human rights treaties could also be supported
by a "reporting mechanism - monitoring committee model. 2 22
This model would be in addition to the other monitoring
mechanisms of the Williams legislation.22 3
For example,
under both the San Francisco ordinance and the proposed
New York City legislation, city departments are required to
undertake a human rights analysis, participate in human
rights training, and establish a task force to identify and
redress areas of discrimination. 224 Likewise, in an education
context, a local ordinance that combines the educational
articles from the ICESCR and CRC could require a city to
undertake educational analysis focusing on the human rights
aims, participate in human rights training with respect to
education, and establish a task force. Importantly, the task
force, aided by the accountability systems already in place,
would identify schools within its city limits that are failing to
afford a quality education-not just particular specified
inputs-to students. Furthermore, the cities would then be
required to develop action plans to redress the failure of local
schools to provide a quality education.
Second, local implementation of the human rights
framework with respect to education may also powerfully
influence policymaking at a state level. Due to the fairly
centralized nature of California's general school financing
222. Cohen, supra note 45, at 1452.
223. See generally Koski, supra note 2.
224. See Yuriko Brunelle, CEDAW: Your Bill of Rights, SAID IT, JanJFeb.
2000, http://www.saidit.org/archives/feb00/feb-articlel.html; see also The New
York City Human Rights Initiative, http://www.aclu.org/hrc/NYC-Initiative.pdf
(last visited Feb. 13, 2008); Women's Institute for Leadership Development of
Human Rights, http://www.wildforhumanrights.org/ourwork/cedaw.html
(last
visited Feb. 13, 2008).
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system, implementation at a state level would be an
important goal to which local advocates should aspire for the
most effective, far-reaching results.22 5 The more local bodies
adopt measures framing education as a human right, the
more future legislative efforts can rest on grassroots support
and/or models of effective policy.
Further, if adequate
education is deemed to be an actionable right under the
California Constitution, widespread local adoption of human
rights norms may serve as a forceful reference when
constructing legislation to effectuate appropriate education
policy that respects such a right.
Local use of human rights policy, however, should not be
seen as useful only as a springboard for state adoption. Even
without adoption at a state level, there are benefits to purely
local policy, such as greater accountability and greater access
to a local administrator,2 2 6 which will serve to ameliorate
some present disappointments. Especially in larger, diverse
cities, local law that recognizes education as a human right
and affirmatively requires identification and redress of
problem schools can be beneficial for children presently facing
inadequate education within city boundaries. Thus, given the
direct approach of the human rights norms in the CRC and
ICESCR and the treaties' focus on the provision of education,
California should look to these human rights instruments in
developing an effective and enduring education policy.
VI. CONCLUSION

Over thirty years after the California Supreme Court
began the State's journey towards creating equal educational
opportunities using the tool of school financing, vast
discrepancies still remain. The Williams Complaint and
subsequent settlement illustrate this gross disparity.
Importantly, however, it brings into light the deeply
embedded socioeconomic issues present in unequal public
education-issues that school finance policy since Serrano I
has not sufficiently addressed and specific resource standards
225. See generally GAY J. MCDOUGALL & ERIC TARS, THE JUSTICIABILITY OF
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN THE U.S.: DOMESTIC
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RIGHT TO EQUAL EDUCATION, GLOBAL RIGHTS,
http://www.globalrights.org/site/DocServer/FinalRight toEducation__11.12.pd

f.
226. See Trifiletti, supra note 2, at 1000.
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and grants will likely fail to reach in the future. If education
in California truly is a "fundamental interest,"22 7 the state
and local government should ensure that California's children
are actually being educated. Such a task requires an action
plan that addresses peripheral concerns and obstacles to
obtaining such education.
It demands that the focus of
education policy be on providing education and that it not be
limited by the restricted reach of resource distribution. A
multi-dimensional problem calls for a multi-dimensional
solution.
The international framework under the ICESCR and
CRC obliges policymakers and communities to focus on
providing a system that allows all children, without economic
discrimination, to gain ongoing access to the quality
education necessary to develop their full potential.22 8
Although the Williams settlement is surely a victory for
California's children, 229 its major focus on textbooks, facilities,
and other input-based measures fails to sufficiently and
thoroughly address unequal educational opportunities. By
relying on proxies of equal funding and provision of resources
to determine whether children are afforded equal educational
opportunities, California loses sight of the principal goal: All
children should have available, accessible, acceptable, and
adaptable education.23 ° Recognition of human rights concepts
in education policy would shift the focus from the proxy to the
principal goal and require the government to work directly on
effective, comprehensive, and long-term solutions to the
varying problems that stand in the way of a child's access to
quality education.

227.
228.
229.
230.

Serrano v. Priest (Serrano1), 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971).
See infra Part II.A-B.
See Lockard, supra note 12, at 412.
See The Right to Education,supra note 21, 6.

